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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CAPATOS: DEATH, BIRTH, AND
GOVERNMENT BENEFITS
Like many newlyweds, Karen and Robert Capato dreamed of
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starting a family. However, following their 1999 wedding, Robert
was diagnosed with esophageal cancer. 1 After learning that the
recommended cancer treatments could impair his fertility, the
couple used a sperm bank to store Robert’s sperm. 2 Unfortunately,
Robert’s condition quickly deteriorated and he lost his battle with
cancer in March of 2002. 3
After Robert’s death Karen decided to use Robert’s frozen
sperm to attempt to conceive a child. 4 In 2003, eighteen months
after Robert’s death, Karen delivered twins. 5 Karen then applied
for Social Security survivor’s benefits for these children. 6 The
Social Security Administration denied Karen’s application based
on the fact that the twins were not eligible to inherit under Florida
intestacy law, 7 Florida being the state in which Robert Capato had
been domiciled when he died. 8 Karen contested the result, thereby
igniting a legal battle that ultimately ended at the United States
Supreme Court in Astrue v. Capato. 9
In May of 2012, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously ruled in favor of the Social Security Administration
and held that, in accordance with the relevant Social Security
statute, 10 state intestacy law shall determine whether children
conceived posthumously are entitled to collect survivor’s benefits. 11
This ruling, while an accurate and logical interpretation of the
relevant statute, 12 highlights the legal and ethical challenges
1. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
2. See id. (banking Robert’s sperm would later allow them to create the
family they desired, although while undergoing cancer treatments Robert and
Karen naturally conceived a son in 2001).
3. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627-628 (3d
Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 576 (2011), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
4. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
5. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 628.
6. Id.
7. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West
2010) (stating that to inherit intestate afterborn heirs must have been
conceived before the decedent’s death).
8. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 627.
9. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(2)(A)(2004):
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or
currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by
the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at
the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is
dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of
his death, or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any
State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who
according to such law would have the same status relative to taking
intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.
11. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(2)(A).
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arising from the ever-increasing use 13 of assisted reproductive
techniques (hereinafter “ART”). Although Capato clarifies that
state intestacy law governs in such cases, since not all state
statutes directly address children conceived posthumously, this
issue continues to play out in the courts. 14
In Part II, this Comment will provide an overview of both the
purpose of Social Security and the growth of ART, which has
enabled posthumous conception to be a reality. Part III will then
explain how ART has altered traditional notions about genetics 15
and parenthood, and has made Social Security’s reliance on state
intestacy statutes an undesirable method of awarding survivor’s
benefits. 16 Finally, Part IV of this Comment will argue that
13. See Liza Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 12 (2007)
(describing how in 2004, 50,000 children were born using IVF, which was an
128% increase from 1996 and stating that “[e]very American adult now has
either undergone fertility treatments or knows someone who has”). See also
FastStats-Infertility, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/fertile.htm (last visited May 9, 2014) (stating that in
the United States, 7.4 million women have used fertility services).
14. See Margery A. Beck, Survivor’s benefits for AI children conceived
posthumously?, THE LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2012,
http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/statehouse/survivor-s-benefitsfor-ai-children-conceived-posthumously/article_fe61955c-b11a-5837-b867-4627
1422b3b0.html#.UHsuTcRWAYg.email (showing Nebraska’s Supreme Court
heard a posthumous reproduction case in October 2012); see also Joseph H.
Karlin, Comment, "Daddy, Can You Spare A Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights of
Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1317, 1348 (2006)
(stating that courts will continue to see litigation in states where intestacy
statutes are unclear regarding the rights of posthumous children or are
construed to deny them the right to inherit). Although written prior to Capato,
the continued reliance on state intestacy statutes means that this will likely
hold true. Id.
15. Compare Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional
Conceptions: Social Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived
Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 301 (1999) (describing that the modern
family is bound more by commitment and less by blood, since today’s
American family does not depend on a biological link with family members
and many parents voluntarily choose to raise children not genetically their
own), with Susan Frelich Appleton & D. Kelly Weisberg, ADOPTION AND
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: FAMILIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 268-69 (2009)
(raising the question of whether a biological connection should be essential to
a child’s status and rights and noting that the new Uniform Parentage Act
§ 707 (2000, amended 2002) places an importance on biology in that it allows a
posthumous child to qualify for benefits or inheritance rights if prior to the
death of the individual they consented to the postmortem use of their
reproductive material); but see Understanding the Uniform Parentage Act,
LAWYERS.COM, http://family-law.lawyers.com/paternity/The-Uniform-ParentageAct-of-2002.html (last visited May 9, 2014) (noting that only seven states,
Delaware, Texas, Washington, North Dakota, Utah, Oklahoma, and Wyoming,
have adopted the most recent version of the law).
16. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception,
and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 627, 656 (2005) (stating that the federal law
that allows the presumption of dependency based on state intestacy statutes,
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allowing posthumously conceived children to collect such benefits
unfairly burdens the federal taxpayer. 17 Therefore Congress
should draft a narrowly construed Social Security amendment
prohibiting posthumously conceived children from being deemed
“dependents” or “survivors.” 18

II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF
SOCIAL SECURITY AND ART
A. Social Security
Social Security was created in 1934 in the midst of the Great
Depression to provide a financial safety net for Americans. 19 Social
Security allows people over age sixty-five or those who lose a job to
collect a monthly stipend. 20 Stipend amounts vary depending upon
a number system of “credits” that takes into account both 1) years
of employment and 2) previous income level. 21 This program is
provides an incentive for a person to use a deceased wage earner’s sperm). In
the era of ART, survivor’s benefits should not provide an incentive to use one
individual’s sperm over another, or provide a financial windfall for those who
do use a deceased wage earner’s sperm. Id.
17. See id. at 627 (describing that a widow who desires to have a child can
chose between an anonymous sperm donor or, if her husband stored sperm
prior to his death, can choose the sperm of her husband). While choosing her
former husband might be desirable for many reasons, her choice may also be
impacted by the fact that the federal government has “inadvertently” created
financial incentives for her to use her dead partner’s sperm. Id. at 627-28. For
example, she may be eligible for survivor’s benefits for both her and the child
amounting to “cash payments totaling hundreds of dollars [each] month for
years.” Id. at 628.
18. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass.
2002) (demonstrating that this need for legislation has been previously stated:
As these technologies advance, the number of children [born using ART]
they produce will continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral,
legal, social, and ethical questions that surround their birth. The
questions present in this case cry out for lengthy, careful examination
outside the adversary process, which can only address the specific
circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They demand a
comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the people.).
Compare with Banks, supra note 15, at 259 (Congress should amend the
Act to expressly address the relational status of such children).
19. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOCIAL
SECURITY, www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited May 9, 2014).
Accord Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Social Security: Principles to Guide
Reform, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2008) (describing how at Social
Security’s outset President Roosevelt explained its purpose, “We can never
insure one hundred percent of the population against one hundred percent of
the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to frame a law which
will give some measure of protection to the average citizen against a job loss or
poverty-ridden old age.”).
20. SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19.
21. See Banks, supra note 15, at 310 (explaining that the employee’s
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largely paid for through payroll taxes placed upon employed
citizens. 22
Survivor’s benefits were first added to Social Security in
1939. 23 If a wage earner dies, these benefits provide monthly
payments for widows, surviving dependent children, and surviving
dependent parents. 24 In order to receive benefits, the individual
must be able to demonstrate actual dependency upon the decedent
at the time of death. 25 In recognition that not all children will be
deemed dependent if a parent dies, 26 state intestacy law governs
who can qualify to receive benefits. 27 Thus, while state intestacy
statutes are drafted with the intent to determine the distribution
of personal property, these statutes also directly impact who
qualifies for survivor’s benefits.

B. Assisted Reproductive Techniques
Analyzing whether survivor’s benefits should extend to
posthumously conceived children requires an understanding of
how ART has permanently altered the ways in which many
modern families are created. 28 All human life begins with the
earning history indicates whether the worker has accumulated enough credits,
which are gained through employment, to allow the worker to collect Social
Security payments). The amount of Social Security that the worker receives
corresponds to their average earnings. Id.
22. SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19; see also Banks, supra note 15, at 30708 (describing that in 1937, Social Security began to be funded by specially
created trust funds that held money collected from taxes placed on worker’s
earnings).
23. SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19; accord Banks, supra note 15, at 30506 (explaining that benefits were extended to the dependents of workers who
had accumulated enough qualified earnings).
24. SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19; accord Banks, supra note 15, at 31112 (describing that an applicant’s “relational status to a deceased wage earner
is paramount” in obtaining survivor’s insurance benefits). Potential
dependents include the widow or widower, children of the deceased who
remain unmarried and are under the age of eighteen, the parent of the
deceased’s child if the child is under sixteen years old, parents over age sixtyfive who were dependent on the deceased, and surviving divorced spouses. Id.
25. John Doroghazi, Note, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered
Questions about Social Security Benefits For Posthumously Conceived
Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597, 1606-07 (2005).
26. See Survivor’s Benefits, SOCIAL SECURITY 1, 4 (2012), www.ssa.gov/pubs
/10084.pdf (stating when a working parent dies, ninety-eight out of every 100
children will be eligible to receive survivor’s benefits); see also Capato, 132 S.
Ct. at 2032 (explaining that “[t]he aim was not to create a program generally
benefiting needy persons; it was . . . to provide . . . dependent members of a
wage earner's family with protection against the hardship occasioned by the
loss of the insured's earnings.”).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(2)(A).
28. See Tom Frame, CHILDREN ON DEMAND: THE ETHICS OF DEFYING
NATURE 17 (2008) (describing the expansion of ART as a virtual revolution
offering possibilities for parenthood that were unimaginable in years prior).
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union of a sperm, provided by the male, and an egg, provided by
the female. 29 While in most cases this occurs without assistance, 30
an entire industry now exists to offer assistance to couples
experiencing infertility. 31 One consequence 32 of the growth of this
industry has been the “mainstreaming” of ART; 33 these services
are now being utilized by people who are not experiencing
problems with infertility, but can otherwise benefit from the
assistance of reproductive services. 34
Assisted reproduction involves the storage and manipulation
of gametes, human reproductive material more commonly referred
to as eggs and sperm. 35 The oldest ART procedure is artificial
insemination, which manipulates the introduction of sperm into
the female’s reproductive system. 36 Another option is in vitro
29. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION &
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 24 (2004)
(explaining that gametes are the “precursors” of all human life); see also
Banks, supra note 15, at 269 (stating that “[p]rior to conception, human
gametes consist of the female egg and the male sperm.”).
30. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 1 (2006) (stating that babymaking is “the oldest production known to humankind” and for most people
creating a baby is so simple that it often happens by accident).
31. See Frame, supra note 28, at 144 (describing the fertility industry as a
big business that produces substantial profits and employs thousands of
people worldwide).
32. See Mundy, supra note 13, at 11 (discussing consequences and noting
that creating a means for people to reproduce without having sex “has had
consequences both expected and unforeseen . . . [r]eproductive technology is
mirroring social change, but it also enables and drives that change, in ways
that will affect every single citizen, and probably already have.”).
33. Id. at 11. “So broad is the patient base, and so eager is the field to
accommodate them, that assisted reproduction has gone from being an
oddball, fringe technology to being perhaps the most socially influential
reproductive technology of the twenty-first century.” Id.
34. See Mary Warnock, MAKING BABIES: IS THERE A RIGHT TO HAVE
CHILDREN? 55 (2002) (explaining that people utilizing assisted reproduction
techniques include those who are not infertile, such as homosexuals trying to
start a family, couples whose children would have a high risk of having an
inherited disease, or individuals desiring to store their genetic material for a
time when it is more convenient to have children, such as a successful
ballerina waiting until her performance days are over); Accord Mundy, supra
note 13, at 10-11 (describing that fertility services are being utilized by people
who want to start a family but do not have a partner or spouse, lesbian women
and gay men, and patients who want to ensure that their children do not
inherit certain genetic diseases).
35. See Banks supra note 15, at 269 (describing eggs and sperm as the
beginnings of human life).
36. See Ruth Deech & Anna Smajdor, FROM IVF TO IMMORTALITY 15 (2007)
(explaining that artificial insemination was proscribed by a doctor during the
1700s); Accord APPLETON & WEISBERG, supra note 15, at 239 (describing how
evidence shows AIH, artificial insemination with the husband’s sperm, began
in the 1790s whereas AID, artificial insemination with sperm provided by a
donor, began in 1884); see also Jenna M. F. Suppon, Life After Death: The Need
to Address the Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 FAM. CT.
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fertilization, which was first successful in 1978 37 and requires
extracting a woman’s eggs, fertilizing them in a laboratory, and
then placing the newly fertilized embryo(s) into the woman’s
uterus. 38
These
techniques
are
made
possible
through
cryopreservation, the freezing of sperm, eggs, and embryos at very
low temperatures. 39 By allowing the genetic material to survive for
extended periods of time, cryopreservation is largely responsible
for the success and expansion of ART. 40 Using cryopreservation,
people can now preserve their sperm or eggs for future use,
including use after they have died. 41 It is cryopreservation that
has made posthumous conception a reality.

C. Posthumous Birth Versus Posthumous Conception
Posthumous conception varies importantly from posthumous
birth; while posthumous birth has existed since the dawn of
time, 42 posthumous conception began only with the availability of
cryopreservation. 43 Posthumous conception can take place weeks,
months, or even years after the death of the parent whose gametes
are used. 44 While society grapples with whether posthumously
REV. 228, 230 (2010) (explaining that artificial insemination was one of the
earliest, least expensive, and most successful reproductive technology methods
available).
37. See Mundy, supra note 13, at 7-8 (telling of how the scientist Robert
Edwards and gynecological surgeon Patrick Steptoe orchestrated the birth of
Louise Joy Brown, the first IVF baby in Oldham, England in 1978).
38. Suppon, supra note 36, at 230.
39. Banks, supra note 15, at 257 (“The increase in use of assisted
reproduction is due largely to the development of the process of cryogenetical
freezing of human concepti.”).
40. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 29 (2004)
(referring to cryopreservation as “essential” and integral part of ART); see also
Deech & Smajdor, supra note 36, at 24 (describing how freezing techniques are
used in many different reproductive therapies with differing levels of success).
Success rates vary because while sperm and embryos are easy to thaw and
unthaw, eggs are more difficult to successfully freeze. Id.
41. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1035
(1994).
42. See Susan L. Crockin, J.D. & Howard W. Jones Jr., M.D., LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 276 (2010) (stating that long before ART, children have been
born after the death of their fathers and that the law has previously dealt with
clarifying legal issues concerning posthumously born children).
43. See Doroghazi, supra note 25, at 1601-02 (stating that when it comes to
posthumous conception, cryopreservation is the most important assisted
reproduction technique).
44. See Banks, supra note 15, at 270 (explaining that when the freezing
temperature is minus 100 degrees Celsius, sperm can remain frozen for at
least ten years); see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the
Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34
ACTEC L.J. 154, 155 (2008) (stating that a child was born using sperm frozen
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conceived children have a right to survivor’s benefits, 45 children
conceived prior to their parent’s death but born afterwards are
immune from this legal debate. 46

D. The Curious Intersection of Social Security
Survivor’s Benefits and Posthumous Reproduction
Social Security’s reliance on intestate succession law arose in
an era when ART’s influence could not have been foreseen. 47 Legal
inconsistencies occur partly because as the use of ART has grown,
the federal, state, and local governments have failed to create
legislation to keep pace with the changing constructions of
American families. 48 As a result, the legal status of posthumous
children varies significantly across state lines. Currently fourteen
states have legislation that applies specifically to posthumously
conceived children. 49 Five of those states deny the children the
right to inherit from the deceased parent’s estate. 50 Nine states
allow intestate inheritance but make it contingent upon certain
requirements being satisfied. 51
Although posthumous conception still takes place in relatively

for twenty-one years, citing Baby Born from Sperm Frozen for Record 21
Years, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WEEK, June 19, 2004, at 59).
45. See Banks, supra note 15, at 256 (explaining that since the 1980s, the
incredible advancements in medical technology for ART created an entirely
new “class of children” that has left the legal community confronting “a myriad
of novel issues and controversies” that have not previously been addressed by
legislation).
46. See Appleton & Weisberg, supra note 15, at 267 (stating that “[a]
common law presumption, now codified in many states, legitimates a child
born within nine months after the death of the mother’s husband.”); See also
Crockin & Jones, supra note 42, at 276 (explaining that most states have
either statutes or case law that acknowledges paternity of children born
within a certain time period, often a year, after the death of their presumed
father); see also Uniform Parentage Act § 204 (2002) (explaining that a man is
the presumed father of a child if he was married to the child’s mother and the
child is born within 300 days of the man’s death).
47. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (stating that “[t]he technology that made
the twins' conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated
by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act (Act)
originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965).”).
48. Appleton & Weisberg, supra note 15, at 235.
49. Karlin, supra note 14, at 1335.
50. See id. (listing Georgia, Idaho, South Carolina and Virginia as denying
intestate inheritance). Florida also denies intestate inheritance, but does allow
posthumous children to make claims against the decedent’s estate unless the
child was specifically provided for in the decedent’s will. Id.
51. See id. (explaining that if the individual consented to the posthumous
use of their gametes a child can inherit in the following states: California,
Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming).
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small numbers, these numbers are on the rise. 52 In recent years,
courts have seen a dramatic increase in cases involving this
topic. 53 Most of these cases deal specifically with inheritance rights
and Social Security benefits, 54 and the facts usually bear striking
similarity to those presented in Capato. 55 The fact that many state
intestacy statutes are silent on the topic of posthumous
reproduction 56 leaves courts trying to decipher legislative intent
when posthumous reproduction likely could not have even been
foreseen when the legislation was drafted. 57 In applying state
intestacy law to these novel questions, courts across the country
52. See Major Maria Doucettperry, To Be Continued: A Look at
Posthumous Reproduction As It Relates to Today’s Military, ARMY LAW., May
2008, at 1, 2 (explaining that posthumous conceptions are an increasingly
relevant issue due to the growing use of ART procedures, the ability to bank
sperm or eggs before undergoing medical procedures that may impair fertility,
and military members choosing to bank their genetic material before being
deployed into highly dangerous areas).
53. See id. at 8 (explaining that beginning in 1993, state and federal courts
have seen increasing numbers of cases regarding posthumously conceived
children’s right to inherit and to collect survivors benefits); see also Suppon,
supra note 36, at 231 (explaining that the absence of legislation has forced
courts to determine the legal status posthumously conceived children have
regarding inheritance and benefits).
54. See Doucettperry, supra note 52, at 8 (stating that most cases deal
exclusively with benefits or inheritance rights).
55. Compare Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025-26, with Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d
954, 957 (8th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012) (stating that
widow used the sperm her husband had stored during cancer treatment to
conceive a child after his death and then filed suit to collect Social Security
benefits for that child), and Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F.Supp.2d
1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005)(stating a widow lost her husband to a heart
attack, had his sperm collected posthumously, used it to conceive, and then
brought a suit to collect survivor’s benefits), and Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
371 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2004) abrogated by Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S.
Ct. 2021 (explaining a widow requested Social Security benefits for her
posthumously conceived twins), and Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850-851
(2008) (stating that after her husband died a widow used a frozen embryo from
fertility treatments she and her husband had undergone while he was alive,
and then filed suit to collect survivor’s benefits for that child), and Woodward,
760 N.E.2d at 260 (stating that a widow sued to collect Social Security for
twins she conceived after her husband passed away using sperm he had stored
during his cancer treatment), and Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930
A.2d 1180, 1182 (2007) (stating that widow brought suit to collect Social
Security benefits for her daughter who was conceived posthumously by sperm
that her husband had stored prior to treatment for cancer).
56. See Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Tales from the Crib: Posthumous
Reproduction and Art, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 311, 318-319 (2012) (stating at the
time author wrote the article only fourteen states had specifically enacted
statutes regarding posthumous reproduction).
57. See Banks, supra note 15, at 320 (mentioning that “[t]here is no doubt
that early lawmakers never envisioned a time when social protocol and
scientific advancements would compel equal treatment for dependent nonmarital children, after-born children, adopted children, and even stepchildren.”).
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have come to differing conclusions. 58 The results of two cases
decided by the state supreme courts in the neighboring states of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire illustrate how courts
grappling with the same question come to alternate conclusions.
In Massachusetts, Lauren Woodward was widowed after her
husband lost his battle with leukemia. 59 Two years later she gave
birth to twins she conceived using her husband’s banked sperm. 60
After being denied Social Security benefits for the twins she filed
suit. 61
In the resulting case, Woodward v. Commissioner of Social
Security, the Massachusetts Supreme Court looked at the state
intestacy law which provided that “posthumous children shall be
considered living at the death of their parent.” 62 Since the
Massachusetts legislature did not define posthumous children
when it drafted the statute in the 1800s, 63 the court in Woodward
determined that there was no definitive requirement that
posthumous children “be in existence” at the time of the decedent’s
death. 64 Although the date the statute was written indicates that
originally it could only have referred to posthumously born
children, 65 the court declined to bar posthumously conceived
children from inheriting in the absence of “express legislative
directive.” 66
In New Hampshire, Donna Eng also lost her husband, Rumzi
Brian Khabbaz, to cancer. 67 After his death, she used sperm that
her husband had banked during cancer treatments and conceived
a daughter. 68 Like Woodward, she then applied for survivor’s
benefits for her daughter and was denied. 69 In Khabbaz v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 70 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire examined the intestacy statute, which stated that

58. See Crockin & Jones, supra note 42, at 279 (listing the states where
courts have ruled on the legal parentage of posthumously born children).
States where judicial decisions determined that posthumously born children
were children of the deceased are Massachusetts, New Jersey, Louisiana and
Arizona. Id. In contrast, Arkansas, California, and New Hampshire did not
acknowledge posthumous parenthood. Id.
59. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 260-261.
62. Id. at 264.
63. See id. (explaining that the posthumous children provision has
remained unchanged for 165 years).
64. Id.
65. See id. (describing that a statute written in the 1800s could not have
conceivably taken into consideration posthumous conception).
66. Id. at 265.
67. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1180.
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“surviving issue” can inherit. 71 Stating that, “the plain meaning of
the word surviving is remaining alive or in existence” 72 the court
held that the statute required her to be alive or in existence at the
time of her father’s death. 73 Under this analysis the court stated
simply, “She was not. She was conceived more than a year after
his death.” 74 The court further stated that no posthumously
conceived children could be deemed “surviving issue” within the
plain meaning of the statute. 75
Woodward and Khabbaz demonstrate the divergent results
that occur when courts must apply antiquated statutes to the
modern reality of posthumously conceived children. States that
have passed such legislation are divided over the issue of whether
these children should be able to inherit intestate. 76 Although the
federal government cannot directly dictate state legislation, 77 since
survivor’s benefits are a federal program it would be prudent to
reach identical results regardless of the state in which their
deceased biological parent happened to be domiciled. An
amendment to the Social Security statute would provide the
needed clarity and consistency.

III. ANALYSIS
The outcomes of Khabbaz and Woodward illustrate the
differing results that occur when courts are forced to reconcile the
legislative intent of state intestacy law with the modern reality of
posthumous reproduction. 78 The continued presence of these
cases 79 made headlines again on October 10, 2012, when the

71. Id. at 1183.
72. Id. at 1183-1184.
73. Id. at 1184.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Karlin, supra note 14, at 1335 (discussing the fourteen states that
have passed legislation and the variation in whether they allow posthumous
children to inherit intestate).
77. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (explaining
that while the federal government may create legislation that preempts state
legislation or may create incentives for states to “adopt regulatory schemes”
the federal government cannot compel state legislation).
78. See generally Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272 and Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at
1186 (explaining how two courts reach opposite conclusions based on differing
state statutes).
79. Posthumously Conceived Child Isn’t Eligible for Survivorship Benefits,
37 FAM. L. REP. 1279 (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://ezproxy.jmls.edu:2078
/flln/FLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=20556520&vname=flrnotallissues&ws
n=497075000&searchid=22312108&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split
=0&scm=FLLNWB&pg=0 (quoting Steven Snyder, Chair of the ABA Family
Law Section's Assisted Reproductive Technologies Committee, as saying,
“Posthumous reproduction is here to stay. The cases will only become more
numerous and more complex.”).
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Nebraska Supreme Court heard arguments in one such
posthumous reproduction case, Amen v. Astrue. 80 The continued
absence of clear state intestacy statutes means that Capato will
not end the flow of these cases through the court system.
Underlying all of these cases is the fundamental question of
whether society has a duty to help support these children. This
Comment will explain that society owes no duty 81 to provide
survivor’s benefits to posthumously conceived children and that
the relevant federal statute should be amended to reflect this.
Providing posthumously conceived children with survivor’s
benefits violates the original intent of Social Security and
exemplifies how Americans have become too reliant on entitlement
benefits. It also places an overemphasis on genetic relationships in
an era when families are increasingly formed without genetic links
to one or both parents, and it unfairly burdens the federal
taxpayer in a misguided attempt to provide for the best interests
of the child.

A. The Inherent Flaws in Relying on
State Intestacy Law
Matters of inheritance and family law are generally within the
province of the states, and admittedly, it is proper for state law to
regulate whether posthumously conceived children may inherit
intestate. However, the changing structure of American families
highlights the inadequacy of Social Security’s reliance on state law
in awarding benefits. Intestate inheritance pertains only to the
distribution of the deceased’s own property. It does not logically
follow that federal taxpayers should bear the burden of supporting
the posthumously conceived solely because a state intestacy statute
included them, when these individuals were likely excluded from
the federal law’s statutory intent. 82 In fact, when Congress amended
survivor’s benefits in 1965 it was actually an attempt to move past
the arbitrary reliance on state intestacy law. 83
80. THE LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR ONLINE, supra note 14.
81. See Robert P. Stoker & Laura A. Wilson, WHEN WORK IS NOT ENOUGH:
STATE AND FEDERAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT NEEDY WORKERS 1-2 (2006)
(detailing programs through which society fulfills any existing duty to aid
needy children and families in economic distress, including food stamps and
free and reduced-price school meals, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
state health insurance programs for children, the child tax credit, Medicaid,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), child care grants, and
rental housing assistance). The availability of these programs demonstrates
that a posthumously conceived child’s failure to qualify for survivor’s benefits
does not preclude them from receiving other financial assistance if needed).
82. See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that the
intent of survivor’s benefits is to protect survivors after the unanticipated
death of a parent).
83. See Margaret Ward Scott, A Look at the Rights and Entitlements of
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B. Posthumously Conceived Children are Outside the
Legislative Intent of the Law
1. Legislative Intent
Examining the purpose of survivor’s benefits may be as
simple as examining the word survivor. Put simply, a survivor is
“one who outlives another.” 84 While Congress could have labeled
the 1939 addition to Social Security as “Descendant’s Benefits” or
“Family Benefits,” Congress chose to place the focus on those
surviving the death of the wage earner. 85
Courts that have chosen to award such benefits to the
posthumously conceived favor a liberal interpretation of survivor’s
benefits. 86 In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit
explained their reasoning to provide posthumously conceived twins
with survivor’s benefits by stating, “the Act is construed liberally
to ensure that children are provided for financially after the death
of a parent.” 87 Perhaps this construction is too liberal. Was the Act
really designed to provide widows or widowers with financial
support to embark on a second chance at starting a family? 88

Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive
Wild West, 52 EMORY L.J. 963, 976 (2003) (citing S. REP. NO. 404, at 110
(1965) (describing that Congress moved away from the heavy reliance on state
intestacy law in an effort to avoid penalizing illegitimate children for being
born to unwed parents). Although posthumous children are also born outside
of marriage, it is not their illegitimate status that precludes them from
collecting survivor’s benefits; rather, it is that they do not qualify as survivors.
Id.
84. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (9th ed. 2009).
85. See Robert Barnes, Complications Beset Posthumous Reproduction
Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/compli
cations-beset-posthumous-conception-case/2012/03/19/gIQAR5i0NS_story.html
(discussing how during oral arguments in Capato, Scalia questioned how
posthumous children could be deemed survivors if they were not conceived at
the time of their father’s death). See generally Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
86. See Banks, supra note 15, at 308-09 (explaining that, at the time the
article was written in 1999, federal courts had taken a liberal approach in
interpreting survivor’s benefits and had chosen to award benefits if at all
possible). This intent, coupled with a conflicting desire to avoid frivolous
claims, created a tension between honoring the remedial goals of the Act with
the need to protect the system from becoming increasingly overburdened. Id.
Although the article was written thirteen years ago, the tension remains and
the courts continue to attempt to balance these interests. Id.
87. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
88. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59 (explaining that posthumous children
“come into being after it is clear that one of the parents will not be able to
support the child in the ordinary way during the child's lifetime, meaning that
the survivorship benefits would serve a purpose more akin to subsidizing the
continuance of reproductive plans than to insuring against unexpected
losses.”(emphasis in original)).
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The fact that benefits are offered to children who survive the
death of a parent does not create an obligation to offer such
benefits to all children who could have hypothetically been born to
the wage earner if he or she had not died. 89 This is why the Social
Security Administration places an emphasis on being dependent
upon the wage earner. 90 When the death of the biological parent
precedes the conception of a child there can be no real dependency
on the deceased.
2. Concerns with an Entitlement Society
If, as the Social Security Administration reasons in Amen, the
original purpose of survivor’s benefits was to “protect children
from the loss of support due to the unanticipated death of a
parent,” 91 what are we to make of the willingness of some states to
extend survivor’s benefits so far beyond this intent? Proponents of
this extension explain it as a benevolent attempt to provide for the

89. See Garner v. Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1971)
(involving a case where the five illegitimate children of a deceased wage
earner applied for survivor’s benefits and the court concluded that, “Congress
is not obligated to provide benefits for every individual who might conceivably
have been dependent upon the wage earner for support”). Although this case
predates the posthumous conception debate, the analysis over where to draw
the line for survivor’s benefits remains relevant. Id.
90. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52
(1977)) (referencing the importance of dependency, “[t]he aim was not to create
a program generally benefiting needy persons; it was, more particularly, to
provide . . . dependent members of a wage earner's family with protection
against the hardship occasioned by the loss of the insured's earnings”(internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added)); and Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
507 (1976) (stating that the Social Security Act’s requirement that child be
deemed “legitimate” is “ultimately relevant only to the determination of
dependency, and by reference to legislative history indicating that the statute
was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise ‘approved’
children of deceased insureds, but was intended just ‘to replace the support
lost by a child when his father . . . dies.’”); but see Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at
599, abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (sidestepping the importance of
dependency by ruling that since Arizona had eliminated the status of
“illegitimate” the twins are Netting's legitimate children under Arizona law).
They are therefore deemed dependent under § 402(d)(3) and do not have to
show actual dependency under the provisions of § 416(h). Id. Although
abrogated by Capato, this illustrates the broad strokes that courts implement
when attempting to show that posthumously conceived children where
somehow dependent upon the deceased at the time of his or her death. Id.
Capato 132 S. Ct. 2021.
91. Brief for Defendant at 1, Amen v. Astrue, 284 Neb. 691 (2012) (No. S11-1094) 2012 WL 933906, at *1 (emphasis added). See also Beeler v. Astrue,
651 F.3d 954, 966 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating “But whether the granting of child’s
insurance benefits to B.E.B., a posthumously conceived child, would further
the purposes of the Social Security Act is debatable, given the Act’s basic aim
of primarily helping those children who lost support after the unanticipated
death of a parent.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
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best interests of the child. 92 Yet, we do not provide monetary
benefits to children conceived through ART and born to single
parents by choice. Thus, the best interests of the child argument
protects the children born to known sperm donors while
conveniently ignoring those conceived using anonymous sperm
donors.
The expansion of survivor’s benefits to include those who did
not actually survive the death of the wage earner is indicative of
America’s growing entitlement mentality. 93 This expansion has
created a “taker mentality” 94 in which increasing numbers of
Americans receive entitlement benefits, such as Social Security,
without a concern for our nation’s inability to sustain this
economic path. 95 This Comment does not question the merits of
Social Security in general, but reasons that as we struggle to
finance these programs, it is hardly wise to extend Survivor’s
Benefits to those who cannot be classified as survivors, even under
the most liberal standards.

C. What Makes One a Parent? How Providing
Posthumously Conceived Children with Survivor’s
Benefits Overemphasizes the Importance of a Genetic
Connection
Awarding survivor’s benefits to posthumously conceived
children places an artificial importance on genetics. 96 Many loving
and functional families exist where children may not have any
genetic link to one or both of the parents raising them; this is
evidenced through the growth of ART with its use of donor eggs,

92. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 660-61 (2008) infra note 112
(discussing the best interest of the child argument).
93. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Are Entitlements Corrupting Us? Yes,
American Character Is at Stake, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904449149045776196719313135
42.html (explaining that while America began as a country where citizens
would often refuse handouts, in the last century our populace has grown to
rely on entitlement benefits that cost us over two trillion dollars a year, Social
Security payments accounted for over 690 billion dollars in 2010).
94. Id.
95. See id. (stating that Washington understands that the “national
hunger for entitlement benefits” has led to a “financially untenable
trajectory”).
96. See Mundy, supra note 13, at 12-13 (describing the confusion that ART
has created, specifically regarding biological connections, “Reproductive
technology is confusing, and confused. It both affirms and denies the
importance of genetic inheritance.”). This confusion likely contributes to
difficulty within courts and the legislature in determining the weight to give to
genetic connections in the absence of parental involvement. Id.
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donor sperm, and surrogacy, the increased rates of domestic and
overseas adoptions, and rising numbers of gay and lesbian parents
creating families. 97 This has proven that genetics alone do not
make a family or create a parent. 98 Our laws recognize the limited
importance of genetics through termination of parental rights
when birthparents place their children for adoption. Additionally,
several states have laws stipulating that sperm and egg donors
forfeit all parental rights and responsibilities. 99
Despite the decreased importance of genetics in the formation
of many modern American families, proponents of awarding
survivor’s benefits to posthumously conceived children often focus
on the biological connection between the deceased parent and the
child. The Third Circuit expressed this viewpoint in Capato and
questioned why the Court would even look to the text of the
survivor’s benefits statute when the child was the undisputed
biological child of the deceased. 100
While the Capato twins are indeed Robert Capato’s biological
offspring, what, if anything, does this mean? Adoption, sperm
donation, and egg donation demonstrate that biological
connections alone do not make a parent. 101 In Children on
Demand: The Ethics of Defying Nature, Tom Frame explains that
97. See id. at 99:
Assisted reproduction is shaping, and complicating, the way we think
about genetic relationship and its impact on family ties. In a major and
largely unnoticed irony, in vitro fertilization-developed explicitly as a
way to help infertile couples have their own children-now makes
possible families in which the power of biological relationships is often
both affirmed and denied, the importance of genetic inheritance
simultaneously embraced and rejected.
98. See Banks, supra note 15, at 276 (stating that “Parental prerogatives
such as custody, support, and visitation are not exclusively assigned based
upon a person’s biological connection with a child.”).
99. See Appleton & Weisberg, supra note 15, at 264-265 (stating that the
law does not recognize semen donors as fathers); see also Browne Lewis, Two
Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men
Involved In the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
949, 973-74 (2009) (stating that while a sperm donor may be the “biological
parent” of the child in question, many states now have statutes “stripping him
of that status . . . [and] reliev[ing] him of any parental duties to the child.”).
100. Capato, 631 F.3d at 631; but see Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2030
(demonstrating that the Supreme Court recognized this focus on biology as a
misguided form of reasoning and explained that there is nothing in the
legislative history to show that Congress understood “child” to have any
special meaning pertaining to biological parentage or the marriage of the
parents).
As the SSA points out, in 1939, there was no such thing as a scientifically
proven biological relationship between a child and a father, which is . . . part
of the reason that the word ‘biological’ appears nowhere in the Act. Notably, a
biological parent is not necessarily a child's parent under law. Id.
101. See Banks, supra note 15, at 301 (stating that the modern reality of
American families does not depend “solely upon one’s biological affiliation”
with family members).
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when a child is created posthumously it must be acknowledged
that while “the child’s father was plainly essential for the
production of the child [he] is apparently unnecessary for the
child’s continuing care and nurture . . . He is the child’s father only
in name . . . In one sense, the child has no father.” 102 While Frame
refers only to fathers, his point would be applicable to cases of
posthumous motherhood as well. 103 Posthumously conceived
children are in many regards similar to children conceived to
single parents via anonymous egg or sperm donation. In both
instances, the intended parent makes a choice to parent alone. In
each scenario, the child conceived will grow up not ever knowing
one of their biological parents.

D. Who Bears the Responsibility of Safeguarding the
Best Interests of the Child? The Danger Present in
Replacing Parental Responsibility with a Societal Duty
1. The Equal Protection Argument
Advocates of providing survivor’s benefits to posthumously
conceived children maintain that it protects the child’s right to
equal protection under the law. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court expressed this opinion in Woodward when it opined:
Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world the
way the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless.
We may assume that the Legislature intended that such children be
entitled, in so far as possible, to the same rights and protections
under law as children conceived before death. 104

The above quote misconstrues the argument. 105 Of course
102. Frame, supra note 28, at 177.
103. See Evelyne Shuster, Dead Parents Cannot Parent, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1,
1998 http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-01-01/news/9801010039_1_embryosjulie-garber-reproduction (describing perhaps the most publicized case of
attempted posthumous motherhood). Julie Garber had her eggs harvested and
fertilized using donor sperm while she was undergoing cancer treatments. Id.
After she died her parents found a surrogate to carry Garber’s embryo(s) and a
family willing to raise the child. Id. The surrogate’s pregnancy ended in a
miscarriage, but in the interim the case ignited controversy and criticism. Id;
see also CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 42, at 283 (stating that while maternal
posthumous reproduction remains relatively unheard of, as egg freezing is
made more available the issues of posthumous reproduction will likely expand
to maternity).
104. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d. at 266 (internal quotation omitted).
105. Compare id. (describing how benefits must be awarded to preserve the
posthumously conceived children’s right to equal protection under the law),
and Banks, supra note 15, at 295-96 (reasoning that posthumously conceived
children do not “fall within the typically protected suspect classes” and stating
that a state’s denial posthumously conceived children’s right to inheritance
would survive intermediate scrutiny only if there were legitimate state
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posthumously conceived children are “children,” but not all
children fall within the S.S.A.’s definition of children who are
eligible to collect survivor’s benefits. Clearly they should be
entitled to all the constitutional rights and protections of any other
child. However, the ability to collect survivor’s benefits is not a
constitutional right, or even a right at all when one is not a
member of the class of intended beneficiaries. 106
Some scholars have postulated that it is unlikely that
Congress would purposefully create legislation with the goal of
alleviating the effects of poverty and simultaneously exclude
certain “orphaned children” based solely on “the timing of their
birth.” 107 The purpose of excluding posthumously conceived
children is not to penalize them for the timing of their birth or
means of conception. 108 Rather, it is to maintain the original intent
interests to justify the law), with Brief for Defendant, supra note 87, at 32-33
(explaining that an equal protection analysis examines whether the statute in
question treats similarly situated individuals differently). Relatives who were
conceived after the death of the wage earner are not similarly situated to
family members who were at least in utero when the decedent passed away
because “they are not lives in being at the relevant time.” Id.
106. See SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 26 (stating upon the death of a
parent 98% of children will be entitled to survivor’s benefits); see also
Doucettperry, supra note 52, at 16-17, discussing Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Moorhead, 916 F. 2d 261 (5th Cir. 1990) (involving a posthumously born child
who sued to collect military survivor’s benefits). The court found that
“intermediate scrutiny was appropriate in cases involving illegitimate children
to ensure” that the legislation did not have a discriminatory intent. Id. The
Court in Capato dealt with this concern and reasoned, “[n]o showing has been
made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that
prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed
parents. We therefore need not decide whether heightened scrutiny would be
appropriate were that the case.” Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. As long as there
was a rational basis for the legislation, then statutes that serve legitimate
government functions are permissible even if they create a “hardship on a
particular individual subject to it.” Id.
107. Banks, supra note 15, at 345. See also David G. Savage, Supreme
Court Wrestles with Survivors Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/19/nation/la-na-court-in-vitro-20120320
(quoting Scalia, who stated that "[w]hat is at issue here is not whether
children born through artificial insemination get benefits. It's whether
children who are born after the father's death get benefits.”). Although Scalia
said that it related to the timing of their birth, since Capato dealt only with
posthumous conception and did not pertain at all to posthumous birth it can be
assumed that Scalia is referring to posthumously conceived children. Id.
Scalia’s comment illustrates that these individuals are barred from collecting
survivor’s benefits because the timing of their birth precludes them from being
included in the legislative intent of aiding survivors of the deceased. Id. They
are not excluded for any discriminatory reason based on a protected class of
people, such as illegitimate children. Id.
108. See Banks, supra note 15, at 302 (arguing that “[s]ociety should not
punish posthumously conceived children because their parents elected to
procreate by assisted reproduction.” This argument indicates the
misperception that the intent to exclude posthumous children is based upon
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of a governmental program. As when a non-widowed single
individual decides to undergo assisted reproduction or to adopt, it
is a choice they enter into knowingly and they must therefore be
expected to have anticipated the social and financial
responsibilities of parenthood. 109
2. How Far Must We Extend Society’s Duty to Protect the Best
Interest of the Child?
Arguing that survivor’s benefits should be awarded to
posthumously conceived children in order to serve the best
interests of the child fails to acknowledge that, in regards to
posthumous conception, there is no element of surprise at having
to parent alone. 110 There is no unforeseen misfortune that the
government should insulate these families from. The modern
reality of single parenthood by choice means that parenthood is
planned and the parent–to-be will have considered the financial,
social, and emotional undertakings prior to using ART. Since the
pregnancy is not a surprise, the expense of raising a child will
have been budgeted for and knowingly undertaken. 111
While providing survivor’s benefits to children who survive
the death of a parent is a valuable aim, it requires a giant leap to
reason that society owes a duty to financially support the bereaved
in their quest to create the family they would have had if life had
gone as planned. 112 Allowing Social Security to be read to
encompass such a duty is a dangerous extension of the law far
beyond its legislative intent. In fact, the United States Supreme
Court previously recognized that the “high duty” of parenthood lies
primarily on the parents, not the State. 113
the means by which they were brought into the world and is punitive in
nature).
109. Deech and Smajdor, supra note 36, at 169 (describing that while many
single parents may have economic struggles, financial hardship does not befall
all single parents, and advocating that legislation and policy should address
the “financial ability of prospective parents to support a child . . . separately
from their single status.”).
110. Id. at 168 (stating that “[b]y definition, single parenthood brought
about via ART does not come about by accident.”).
111. See id. (stating the non-accidental nature of parenthood after ART,
which allows the secondary conclusion that family budgets will have been
adjusted to take the resulting child into account). See also MUNDY, supra note
13, at 163 (stating that “[t]he important thing . . . is that these were women
who had chosen single motherhood rather than being forced into it. Single
motherhood wasn’t something that happened to them. It was a route they had
planned, chosen, mapped out carefully, and deliberately taken.”).
112. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59 (discussing how allowing posthumously
conceived children to collect survivor’s benefits creates a state-subsidized
second chance at starting a family).
113. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of
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Reproductive freedom entails protecting women’s right to
create a child with their husband’s banked sperm after his
death. 114 While posthumous conception should be available for
individuals who desire it, this does not mean the government has a
broad duty to support individuals created in this manner. As the
Supreme Court explained in Harris v. McRae, “[a]lthough the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize
all the advantages of that freedom.” 115 The Court cautioned that
extending the right to include an entitlement to government
assistance would result in a “drastic change” to the interpretation
of the Constitution. 116
Accordingly, since the child is brought forth with intention
and foresight, it does not logically follow that, after the death has
occurred, these families should collect a federal benefit specifically
designed to protect surviving family members from the premature
loss of the breadwinner. While claiming to defend the best interest
of the child strikes an emotional chord, 117 any children conceived
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”); see also, Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 660-61 (2008) (illustrating
that the sentiment expressed in Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, has a long philosophical
tradition and quoting William Blackstone in Commentaries on the Law of
England (1766):
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by
nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the
world . . . . By begetting them therefore they have entered into a
voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life
which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.
114. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169, (1973), (Stewart, J., concurring)
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (declaring that “[s]everal decisions of this Court make clear
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (stating “[w]e are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (describing the marital right to privacy regarding
contraception and sexual relations).
115. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980). See also FRAME, supra
note 28, at 147 (“[c]laiming a right against interference does not produce an
entitlement to assistance.”).
116. Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
117. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265 (stating that when considering
whether posthumous children should be awarded survivor’s benefits, “[f]irst
and foremost we consider the overriding legislative concern to promote the
best interests of the children.”); but see Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Laws
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posthumously (whose conception will un-arguably be intentional
and planned) must be the responsibility of the existing parent and
not the federal government and taxpayers.

IV. PROPOSAL
The best way to reconcile the legislative intent of Social
Security with the reality of posthumous conception is by amending
the Social Security Act. Although Capato confirmed that state law
governs whether or not posthumously conceived children can
collect benefits, 118 this reliance on state law is not desirable. 119
When existing statutes are silent on the issue, courts must conjure
legislative intent. States where statutes address posthumous
reproduction vary in their responses, thereby creating unequal
access to benefits. These problems could be averted by adding a
brief section to the 42 U.S.C. 416(e) definition of “child” that would
require a child to be conceived and in utero prior to the death of
their parent. 120
This proposal will first address why amending the Social
Security statute best achieves consistency across state lines and
protects legislative intent. This proposal will then explain how
such an amendment will protect a financially overburdened
system while fulfilling three goals: (1) providing a bright-line test
to avoid existing inconsistencies, (2) offering courts the guidance
they seek, and (3) aligning the government’s response to
posthumously conceived children with its response to similarly
situated individuals.
Outpaced by Fertility Advances, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, available at www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/science/ethical/fertility1.htm
(pointing
out that posthumous conception might fundamentally not be in the best
interest of the child and noting that the desires or rights of potential parents,
including the dead, are being placed above the welfare of the children being
produced); FRAME, supra note 28, at 181 (“the right of a widow to have
children with her deceased husband does not override a child’s right to have
two living parents at the time of its conception”).
118. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2031-33.
119. See Banks, supra note 15, at 259 (stating that presumptively
deferring to local law no longer remains a desirable means of determining
survivor benefits).
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(e) (although 416(e) is more detailed than this
excerpt, the main three categories of child are as follows:
The term “child” means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an
individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not less than
one year immediately preceding the day on which application for child's
insurance benefits is filed or (if the insured individual is deceased) not
less than nine months immediately preceding the day on which such
individual died, and (3) a person who is the grandchild or stepgrandchild
of an individual or his spouse, but only if (A) there was no natural or
adoptive parent . . . (B) such person was legally adopted after the death
of such individual. . . .
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A. Amending the Existing Social Security Legislation
Would Best Resolve Post-Capato Inconsistencies
Without taking action to assure consistency across state lines
the benefits for posthumously conceived children will continue to
differ from one state to the next. When Congress created Social
Security it sought to avoid such discrepancies. Prior to the creation
of Social Security only five states provided unemployment
insurance 121 and the Supreme Court acknowledged that this could
serve as a “bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere,
encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.” 122
Without legislative guidance, it is not farfetched to imagine the
following scenario. A couple living in southern New Hampshire
learns that the husband has cancer and chooses to bank his sperm.
As they examine their options in the event he does not recover,
they choose to move just over the border to the neighboring state
of Massachusetts. If he survives, they have done nothing more
than relocate nearby. If he dies, and the wife then uses his sperm
to conceive, this move allows her to receive thousands of dollars in
federal survivor’s benefits that she and the posthumously
conceived child would have been prevented from collecting had
they remained in New Hampshire. 123 An amendment to the Social
Security statute would prevent this type of conduct.
While matters of family law and intestacy law are typically
within the legislative powers of the state, 124 the federal
government has increasingly delved into this domain. 125 In fact,
“[t]he consensus favoring national power is strongest when there
are either horizontal or vertical conflicts between governments
caused or aggravated by the boundaries between states.” 126

121. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937) (noting that
Wisconsin created a benefits system in 1931, and California, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and New York did so in 1935).
122. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).
123. Compare Khabbaz, 155 N.H. at 805-06 (denying posthumously
conceived children the right to inherit intestate in New Hampshire, and
thereby precluding them from collecting survivor’s benefits), with Woodward
760 N.E.2d at 272 (allowing posthumous children to inherit intestate and
thereby providing them with access to survivor’s benefits).
124. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and
the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 273-74 (2009) (stating that
although the Constitution does not discuss whether authority for family
matters is within the province of the states, during the 1800s the Court relied
on the concept of “dual federalism” and established a pattern of abstention
from family law questions).
125. See Estin, supra note 123, at 274-77 (describing how the Supreme
Court and Congress have both had an extensive role in determining matters of
family law).
126. Estin, supra note 123, at 279.
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Whether survivor’s benefits should be awarded to posthumously
conceived children is one such horizontal conflict calling for
national action. In previous federal governmental intervention
into family matters, the government has asserted that it does so to
uphold the federal goals of guaranteeing nationwide uniformity in
eligibility for federal benefits and cautiously safeguarding the
federal treasury. 127 These goals are best accomplished by
amending the existing statute to specifically prohibit children
conceived after the death of a biological parent from collecting
survivor’s benefits.

B. The Benefits of Providing a Bright Line Test
Amending the Social Security statute would create a bright
line test to easily allow survivor’s benefits decisions to be made.
Despite criticisms from detractors, bright line tests provide
fairness and consistency. The Social Security Administration
recently stated that the Legislature is free to draw bright lines in
furtherance of their own administrative interests. 128 In contrast,
some courts have followed the precedent set forth in Woodward
and disfavored any type of bright line test that prevents
posthumously conceived children from collecting benefits. 129
In avoiding the obvious bright line test (because, what better
bright line is there than death?), proponents of softer standards
have set forth far more arbitrary guidelines. In Woodward, the
court ruled that posthumous children should be allowed to collect
survivor’s benefits providing that certain genetic, consent, and
temporal standards are met. 130 California codified similar
standards in an excessively long and convoluted statute that
127. See Brief for Plaintiff Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S.
House of Representatives at 15, Windsor v. U.S., 2012 WL 4338887, (2d Cir.
2012), (justifying the Defense of Marriage Act, an example of federal
intervention into family law, by explaining that it promotes two major federal
goals: “(1) Ensuring nationwide uniformity in substantive eligibility criteria
for federal marital benefits, (2) preserving the federal fisc [sic] . . . .”).
Although this paper does not proclaim to support DOMA or make a judgment
call as to whether or not DOMA will eventually be held constitutional, it
nonetheless stands that the federal government espouses the above as
important legislative goals for federal marital benefits and would likely have
similar goals for other federal benefits, such as Social Security. Id.
128. Brief for Defendant, supra note 89, at 35.
129. See Woodward 760 N.E.2d at 262 (stating, “[i]n this developing and
relatively uncharted area of human relations, bright-line rules are not favored
unless the applicable statute requires them.”).
130. See id. at 272 (ruling that survivor’s benefits should be provided when
the child is genetically related to the decedent and the decedent agreed to
posthumous conception and to support any resulting child). The court also
noted that time limitations may constrain the ability to collect survivors
benefits, but did not mention what it considered to be realistic or fair temporal
limitations. Id.
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allows posthumously conceived children to inherit, and thereby
collect survivor’s benefits, if prior to death an individual consents
to have their genetic material used posthumously and designates
an individual to have control of the genetic material. 131 The
statute also specifies that any such children must be in utero
within two years after the decedent’s passing. 132
The consent requirement makes sense in that it protects the
rights of the decedent, 133 but it creates an odd advantage for those
who can foresee an untimely death. Individuals who can anticipate
possible impending death, through a cancer diagnosis or an
upcoming tour of duty, can bank their gametes and provide the
necessary consent. Where does this leave the widow or widower
who loses a spouse in a car accident or a violent crime? In an effort
to ignore the obvious bright line that death provides, allowing
131. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West):
For purposes of determining rights to property to be distributed upon
the death of a decedent, a child of the decedent conceived and born after
the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the
lifetime of the decedent, and after the execution of all of the decedent's
testamentary instruments, if the child or his or her representative
proves by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) The decedent, in writing, specifies that his or her genetic
material shall be used for the posthumous conception of a child of the
decedent, subject to the following:
(1) The specification shall be signed by the decedent and
dated.
(2) The specification may be revoked or amended only by a
writing, signed by the decedent and dated.
(3) A person is designated by the decedent to control the use
of the genetic material.
(b) The person designated by the decedent to control the use of the
genetic material has given written notice by certified mail, return
receipt requested, that the decedent's genetic material was available
for the purpose of posthumous conception. The notice shall have been
given to a person who has the power to control the distribution of
either the decedent's property or death benefits payable by reason of
the decedent's death, within four months of the date of issuance of a
certificate of the decedent's death or entry of a judgment determining
the fact of the decedent's death, whichever event occurs first.
(c) The child was in utero using the decedent's genetic material
and was in utero within two years of the date of issuance of a
certificate of the decedent's death or entry of a judgment determining
the fact of the decedent's death, whichever event occurs first. This
subdivision does not apply to a child who shares all of his or her
nuclear genes with the person donating the implanted nucleus as a
result of the application of somatic nuclear transfer technology
commonly known as human cloning.
132. Id.
133. See Raymond C. O'Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception:
A Model Act, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 332, 360-61 (2009)
(discussing the importance of including a consent requirement in any
legislation created regarding posthumous conception).
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posthumously conceived children to receive survivor’s benefits if
their biological parent gave consent creates a strange subset of
haves and have-nots where certain benefits are awarded to
descendants of individuals who plan ahead for their untimely
demise. This is counter-intuitive considering the intention to
protect individuals from an unexpected death. 134

C. Providing Courts with Legislative Guidance
In lawsuits regarding posthumous reproduction, courts have
noted that legislative guidance would be appreciated. 135 The
current legislative void surrounding modern reproductive
technologies 136 leaves courts ill-equipped to confront these
“Solomonic” decisions that require an ethical balancing act. 137
Interpreting the law becomes difficult when the laws were created
well before scientific advancements could have been predicted. The
134. Brief for Defendant, supra note 90, at 36-37 (stating that
“[p]osthumously conceived relatives are conceived with full knowledge that the
deceased will be unable to provide support, monetary or otherwise” and
arguing that since there is no “true loss of support” that excluding
posthumously conceived children from inheriting and thereby collecting
survivor’s benefits is rational).
135. Compare Khabbaz, 155 N.H. at 806 (Broderick, J., concurring)
(writing a concurring opinion to specifically request legislative guidance, “I
write separately to respectfully urge the legislature to examine, within the
context of the state's intestacy statute, the confluence of new, ever-expanding
birth technologies and the seemingly arcane language and presumptions
attendant to the settlement of decedents' estates.”), with Woodward, 760
N.E.2d at 272,
As these technologies advance, the number of children they produce will
continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social, and ethical
questions that surround their birth. The questions present in this case cry out
for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only
address the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself.
They demand a comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the
people.
See also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-44 (showing that in regards to Social
Security the courts have looked to the legislature for guidance since the initial
1937 case which upheld the legality of Social Security). The Court explained,
“[w]hether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits set forth in
Title II [of the Social Security Act], it is not for us to say. The answer to such
inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts.” Id. at 644.
136. See Appleton and Weisberg, supra note 15, at 235 (referring to a
general absence of laws regarding ART). See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at xliii (stating that there are no nationally uniform
laws or policies related to assisted reproduction and there is minimal
government involvement).
137. See SPAR, supra note 30, at 225 (describing the difficulty of decisionmaking in the often uncharted waters created by reproductive technology
advances by explaining “[these] are exceedingly difficult decisions, Solomonic
choices that force us to wrestle with the very meaning of life and love and
parenthood. But at the moment we are making these choices in a purely ad
hoc way depending on the state [and] the local court system . . . .”).
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continued presence of posthumous reproduction cases illustrates
that it is no longer prudent to wait for state governments to take
action. Congress should amend the Social Security statute and
thereby create the guidance that courts are seeking.

D. Aligning Posthumously Conceived Children with
Other Classes of Survivors and with Other Children of
Single Parents by Choice
Amending the statute to prevent posthumously conceived
children from collecting benefits is desirable in that it will help
create an equal system of benefits distribution. Despite claims that
denying posthumously conceived children access to survivor’s
benefits thereby violates their rights to due process and equal
protection, it is standard policy for Social Security to provide
survivor’s benefits only to spouses, children, dependent
grandchildren, and dependent parents who are alive at the time of
the decedent’s death. 138

V. CONCLUSION
Posthumous conception carries dramatic emotional appeal
because it intertwines the tragedy of death with the joy of a new
life. Yet, this newfound ability to bear a partner’s children after
their death does not create a corresponding societal duty to
support these children. Such children are not true survivors of the
deceased, and are therefore not entitled to federal aid throughout
their childhood. Amending the Social Security Act would still allow
posthumously conceived children to inherit via testamentary
procedures and to inherit intestate if their state law allows.
Amending § 416(e) to specifically require that to be deemed a child
the child must be alive or in utero at the time of the decedent’s
death would resolve existing discrepancies. This change would also
prevent society from bearing the financial burden of supporting a
widow or widower’s second chance at starting a family. To have a
second opportunity is a miracle of modern science, but this ability
does not create a corresponding societal duty to support these
children.

138. See Brief for Defendant, supra note 90, at 35 (explaining that it is
logical to limit benefits to those who are alive at the time of the decedent’s
death. Although the argument is referring specifically to the Nebraska
intestacy statute the argument is relevant particularly because the statute
dictates who can collect survivor’s benefits).

